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INTRODUCTION
This article reflects on the constitutional dynamics of the United
Kingdom’s (U.K.) departure from the European Union (EU). In section II, I
outline the nature of the U.K.’s political constitution and its tension with
European integration. In section III, I consider the decision to hold a
referendum on the question of EU membership, arguing that its legitimacy
should not have been, but was, questioned. Section IV considers the needless
constitutional panic of late 2016, in which courts wrongly intervened to rule
that the government was not entitled to trigger Article 50, and thus set in
motion the process of terminating the EU treaties, unless and until
Parliament enacted new legislation to this effect. This “crisis that was not”
wrongly encouraged many in high places to think that withdrawal from the
EU had exposed flaws in, or was undermining, the U.K. constitution. In
section V, I outline how Parliament legislated about the legal consequences
of Brexit, including making provision for continuing parliamentary
involvement in relation to approval of, and in the event of failure to
conclude, a withdrawal agreement. Section VI begins to outline the long
crisis of 2019, in which some parliamentarians breached established norms
of parliamentary government. Sections VII and VIII continue the analysis,
considering in turn the prorogation crisis, in which the Supreme Court
abandoned law to intervene in high politics, and its aftermath, in which the
government was maintained in office but not in power. The long crisis
constituted a major test for the U.K.’s political constitution and almost ended
in disaster. Still, while some constitutional vulnerabilities were exposed, the
article shows how the political constitution in the end made provision for
orderly, politically legitimate withdrawal from the EU.

I. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION
The two pillars of the U.K. constitution, I say, are the principle of
responsible government and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 1 This
* Professor of Law and Constitutional Government, University of Oxford and Head of Policy
Exchange’s Judicial Power Project. I thank Erin Delaney and Stephen Tierney for helpful
conversation about the latter’s Global Spotlight lecture, delivered on Nov. 2, 2020. I am also grateful
to Robert Craig, Stephen Laws and participants in the workshop “Constitutions, Peoples and
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Westminster model of constitutional government is a political constitution
insofar as it makes central the law-making power of the Queen-inParliament, disciplined by politics not law, and makes the formation and
direction of government turn on the confidence of the House of Commons
and, in due course, the electorate. While the government is subject to the
law, and the jurisdiction of the courts, it is held to account more generally
by Parliament. The relationship between the government and the Houses of
Parliament is a matter of constitutional convention and political dynamics,
to which accountability to the country at large is vital. The courts are not
responsible for safeguarding the constitution as such or for upholding rights
against Parliament itself. The courts vindicate settled legal rights, including
against government, but responsibility for choosing how best to protect
rights lies with Parliament.
The government enjoys control over the business of the House of
Commons. This control is realised by Standing Order 14 (SO14),2 which has
been central to parliamentary government since the early nineteenth century
and before that had been an informal feature secured by the power of
patronage rather than formal rules. Parliamentary government relies on
government to provide initiative, with Parliament free to react, reject, or
cajole and, in extremis, to remove the government from office by
withdrawing its confidence. The Crown enjoys certain prerogative powers,
which are exercised on the advice of ministers who are accountable to
Parliament. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 3 (FtPA) swept away the
prerogative of dissolution (that is, power to dissolve Parliament and to bring
about an election), but expressly preserved the prerogative of prorogation
(that is, power to control the timing of sessions of Parliament, which frame
parliamentary business). The FtPA prevents an election being held before
the full five-year term of Parliament has run its course unless either: (1) twothirds of the Commons support a motion for an early election; or (2) the
government is defeated on a vote of confidence and there is no vote of
confidence in Her Majesty’s Government within fourteen days of the first
vote. This was a major constitutional change.
The Westminster constitution makes it possible for the people to
participate in reasonable self-government by way of electoral and
parliamentary institutions. The constitution makes radical political and legal
change possible, but the law-making freedom of each successive Parliament
introduces a kind of self-tempering equilibrium. While Parliament has
legally unlimited law-making capacity, it has at times undertaken to forbear
to act in order to facilitate self-government within the British Empire and,
more recently, devolution within the U.K.
The U.K.’s membership in the EU did not change the fundamentals of
the U.K. constitution. However, membership was hard to square with the
constitution’s animating logic and spirit. The U.K. entered into the EU (as it
came to be known) by way of the government’s decision, with parliamentary
support, to commit the U.K. to the EU treaties, with Parliament making
provision by statute for those treaties to have domestic legal effect. As a
matter of domestic law, Parliament remained free to legislate, 4 but in
Sovereignty”, held at Notre Dame Law School’s London campus on Feb. 21, 2020, for helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this article; the usual disclaimer applies.
1 Richard Ekins, Restoring Parliamentary Democracy, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 997 (2018).
2
Standing
Orders
of
the
House
of
Commons,
(2018)
§14,
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmstords/1020/body.html.
3 Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, c. 14 (UK).
4 Richard Ekins, Legislative Freedom in the United Kingdom, 133 L. Q. REV. 582 (2017).
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practice this freedom was heavily curtailed, with EU treaties forming, in
effect, a supra-national constitution, making provision for judicial review of
domestic law. Predictably, European integration compounded political
alienation and encouraged political opposition within the U.K. and European
law more generally.
The question of whether to enter the European Economic Community
(EEC), as it then was, in 1972 was a matter of party-political controversy. In
1975, in view of divisions within the Labour Party about the merits of
European integration, a referendum was held, which by a large majority of
votes assented to continuing membership. In the years that followed, the
reach of European law and EU institutions continued to expand, with
successive governments committing the U.K. to new treaties (sometimes
with opt-outs to avoid full integration, including to the EU’s two flagship
projects, the single currency and the Schengen Area of substantially free
movement of all EU citizens). The government undertook to hold a
referendum on the proposed new European Constitution, but did not hold a
referendum in relation to the Lisbon Treaty, which largely replicated the
Constitution after it failed to win approval in referendums in several states
including France.5 In 2011, Parliament legislated to forbid ratification of any
new EU treaties expanding the powers of EU institutions, without support
in a national referendum. 6
Setting the European question aside, the U.K. constitution makes
provision for strong, effective government, and for robust self-government
by way of parliamentary democracy. A government that enjoys the
confidence of the House of Commons is able to act boldly, but continuing
dependence on parliamentary opinion and electoral accountability is a
powerful restraint. Many scholars take a different view, arguing that the
Westminster constitution encourages, or is predicated on, unjustified
executive dominance and/or risks majoritarian tyranny. Others argue (or
argue also) that the U.K.’s constitutional arrangements are ad hoc, and that
the much-vaunted flexibility of the political constitution is simply an
absence of principle. These perspectives framed much of the response to the
2016 referendum; I consider each in turn.
The fear that the constitution fails to adequately restrain the executive
is not new. English (and thence British) government begins with royal
power, exercised over time by and through parliaments. The struggle
between King and Parliament in the seventeenth century helped shape the
modern constitution, with the Glorious Revolution in 1688–689
authoritatively ending any royal capacity to rule without the support of
Parliament. The efficient secret of the constitution, Bagehot wrote in the
mid-nineteenth century,7 was the near complete fusion of executive and
legislative power in the office of the cabinet. This was an overstatement, but
the coordination of executive and legislative power is a defining feature of
parliamentary government, about which many U.K. lawyers have been
sceptical, often contrasting it, enviously, with the American separation of
powers.
In the twentieth century, the fear was of electoral despotism, 8 with the
rise of mass political parties encouraging the worry that party discipline
5

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION (NW Barber et al. eds., Hart Publishing
2019).
6 European Union Act 2011 c.12.
7 WALTER B AGEHOT, T HE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION (Chapman & Hall 1867).
8 LORD HEWART, T HE NEW DESPOTISM (Ernest Benn Ltd. 1929); see also Editorial, The Guardian
view on the reshuffle: Johnson’s cabinet of courtiers, THE GUARDIAN, (Feb. 13, 2020),
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enabled party leadership to do as it pleased. In the same vein, some lawyers
and judges still often take for granted that a government with a stable
majority is largely free to do as it pleases and that the legislative process
makes little difference in practice to legislation that ministers propose. While
overly strict party discipline might distort parliamentary deliberation, this
analysis is again overstated: a government has to work to maintain a stable
majority and governments are well aware of the political limits within which
they operate. Likewise, study of the legislative process in the U.K. confirms
that legislation introduced by the government is routinely amended and
anticipation of parliamentary resistance, or popular disquiet, weighs heavily
in setting the agenda. 9 Still, the narrative that executive power is rising, and
that Parliament is supine and ineffective, has significant traction. 10
Ironically, the context in which this narrative might have most force is in
relation to EU membership, which does tend to empower executives in
relation to national parliaments precisely because the EU is a treaty-based
organisation.
The fear that the constitution risks majoritarian tyranny is not hard to
understand. Parliamentary sovereignty enables radical law-making action.
There are no legal restraints on Parliament and thus on the people acting by
way of their elected representatives. True, there are two Houses of
Parliament, but the elected House of Commons holds the whip hand and may
invoke the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 to enable enactment
notwithstanding the resistance of the House of Lords. Parliament recognises
and honours constitutional conventions, but these are, by definition, not
legally binding and may not restrain a determined parliamentary or popular
majority. The U.K. is a signatory to the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR), and the Human Rights Act 1998 gives it some domestic
force, but U.K. courts very clearly have no authority to invalidate an Act of
Parliament. For some lawyers and judges, this is an embarrassment and a
problem. Much influenced by (some) continental European and North
American approaches to constitutionalism, they reason that a good
constitution would impose legal limits on Parliament and that the people are
less a source of authority or legitimacy than a standing danger to minority
rights and constitutional (limited) government. 11 The appeal of EU
membership, on this view, is that it squares a circle, subjecting both the
Parliament and the government of the U.K. to hard-edged (if nonetheless
often vague) legal limits, removing in practice the capacity of the people by
way of their representatives to freely to legislate.
Rather different is the perspective of those who argue that the U.K.’s
constitution is characterised by a lack of clarity and a lack of principle. This
is the flipside, it might be said, of the flexibility of the political constitution,
in which parliamentarians are free to act pragmatically without the
constraints of (justiciable) constitutional principle. Like other

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/13/the-guardian-view-on-the-reshufflejohnsons-cabinet-of-courtiers.
9 MEG R USSELL AND D ANIEL GOVER, LEGISLATION AT WESTMINSTER: PARLIAMENTARY ACTORS
AND INFLUENCE IN THE MAKING OF BRITISH L AW (Oxford University Press 2017).
10 Cf. Timothy Endicott’s outstanding lecture, Parliament and the Prerogative: From the Case of
Proclamations to Miller (Nov. 30, 2016) (Policy Exchange, London), published (in revised and
updated form) as The Stubborn Stain Theory of Executive Power: From Magna Carta to Miller,
POL’Y EXCHANGE (Sep. 7, 2017), https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/TheStubborn-Stain-Theory-of-Executive-Power.pdf.
11 See, e.g., Lord Hope, Is the Rule of Law now the Sovereign Principle?, in RICHARD R AWLINGS
ET. AL., SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LAW 89 (Oxford University Press 2013).
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commentators,12 I take the view that the U.K. constitution has proved
remarkably capable of organic development without major rupture, with the
U.K. adapting peacefully and pragmatically to the gain and loss of empire,
industrialisation, mass democracy, devolution, and, perhaps European
integration. For some, the worry is that this approach stores up troubles of
its own or has reached its limits, including in relation to Europe and
devolution, where the asymmetries of the territorial constitution risk
political tension.13 European membership interacted in important ways with
devolution insofar as the U.K. was able to rely on European law to help
delimit the authority of the devolved institutions. If the U.K. before 1973
had an “uncontrolled constitution,”14 centring on parliamentary government
and making possible pragmatic political change, European integration
provided a kind of external constitution, unified by the idea of ever closer
union and serving to address supposed problems in the U.K.’s
arrangements.15
These different perspectives on the constitution before 2016 help
explain why the electorate’s decision to withdraw from the EU was received
by some as an unravelling of vital restraints, returning to the fore longstanding problems of executive dominance and parliamentary absolutism,
and by others as further evidence of the U.K.’s pragmatic, but unprincipled
approach to constitutional change. For my part, I saw the decision to
withdraw from the EU as a constitutional restoration, rejecting integration
in a political order that frustrated self-government.16 In making this decision,
the British people rejected the ratchet of European integration, in which
changes only move in one direction and in which withdrawing from an evercloser union is not an option. This difference in perspective was to inform
reaction, not only to the referendum outcome itself, but to the subsequent
contest about how, and in the end, whether it should be implemented.

II. THE REFERENDUM AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
For many members of the legal and political elite, the referendum result
was confirmation that the people had either been misled into making a very
bad decision or had simply made a very bad decision, motivated by
selfishness, ignorance, racism, or nostalgia for empire. Either way, the result
showed that the people had wrongly been permitted directly to make a
decision that should not have been put to them, in which the risk of making
the wrong decision was too high. Unsurprisingly, but still strikingly, many
of those who abhorred the referendum result went on to argue that the
referendum was illegitimate and should not be implemented.
This argument took several forms. One form was to maintain that the
use of a referendum to settle the question of whether the U.K. should leave
the EU was inconsistent with parliamentary democracy. That is, the
12

Lord Sumption, Law and the Decline of Politics, BBC REITH LECTURES (May 25, 2019),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m00057m8.
13 Aileen McHarg, Navigating without maps: Constitutional silence and the management of the
Brexit crisis, 16 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 952 (2018).
14 An “uncontrolled constitution” is a term of art intended to convey that the legislature has authority
to change the constitution by ordinary legislative action rather than by way of some special
procedure. McCawley v. The King [1920] A.C. 691. See also Ekins, supra note 4.
15 Vernon Bogdanor, Brexit and our Unprotected Constitution, T HE CONST. S OC’Y (Feb. 21, 2018),
https://consoc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Brexit-and-our-unprotected-constitutionweb.pdf.
16 Ekins, supra note 1.
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referendum was a technique foreign to the U.K. constitution and it had been
wrong to invite the people directly to answer this question. 17 Further, that
the question had been put to the people in the first place confirmed the extent
to which the Westminster constitution failed to limit executive power, with
responsibility for calling the referendum attributed to the whim of Prime
Minister Cameron. This line of argument was not persuasive. Cameron’s
support for calling a referendum had of course been very important, not
because as Prime Minister it lay within his gift, but because some years
earlier he had chosen to lead the Conservative Party in campaigning on a
manifesto commitment to hold a referendum on the European question. He
could perhaps have decided otherwise, but he chose to do so in a context of
party-political competition, in which the U.K. Independence Party, an
insurgent Euro-sceptic party, was clearly eroding support for the
Conservative Party and in which offering a referendum was a policy on
which to differentiate oneself from the Labour Party. Both the other major
political parties had campaigned to offer referendums on European
questions in the recent past and legislation enacted in 2011 made
referendums a partial lock on further European integration. The partypolitical pressure to which the Conservative Party leadership responded,
including the imperative of crafting a policy which Eurosceptic and
Europhile wings of the party alike could both support, resulted in the
decision to campaign for a referendum.
The Prime Minister was able to propose a referendum in government
only because he had secured a parliamentary majority in the 2015 election.
And when legislation was introduced to enable the referendum, it was
striking that it passed by overwhelming majorities in both Houses of
Parliament: very few in public life felt able to oppose putting the question to
the people. The case for so doing was obvious. Whether to continue with EU
membership was a question that went to constitutional identity and which
cut across political lines, save that there was a widespread and accurate view
that many more of the general public were keen on withdrawal than were
their elected representatives. In fairness then, an obvious way to determine
whether the U.K. should continue to consent to remain in the EU was to hold
a referendum. Pace the feverish arguments in 2016, the constitutional
referendum was an established technique of parliamentary democracy,
which had been used in the U.K. across recent decades and even more often
in the Commonwealth. There are very good reasons to avoid regular
recourse to referendums, especially in the context of “ordinary” law-making,
but these reasons subside in the constitutional context.
Still, the thought lingered that it was Prime Ministerial fiat, which had
unleashed a populist insurrection, somehow substituting popular sovereignty
for parliamentary sovereignty. And it was on parliamentary sovereignty that
opponents of Brexit immediately relied, asserting that the referendum could
only be “advisory” and that it was for Parliament to decide what, if anything,
to do next. The case for Parliament to do nothing—that is, to reject the
referendum result—was that parliamentarians had a duty to use their
judgement and to act for the common good. That is, they would betray their
constituents if they simply executed their will. 18 The referendum was clearly
not legally binding, I say, but it scarcely follows that it was merely advisory.
Introducing the Referendum Bill to Parliament, the government made clear
17

Lord Sumption, supra note 12.
Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Nov. 3, 1774) (available at https://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html).
18
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that the point was to put the decision about whether to leave or remain in the
hands of the British people and not in the hands of Parliament or the
government. The government (campaigning for Remain) wrote to every
household in the country during the campaign to confirm that the vote would
be authoritative. Its force was political, as might be expected in a country
with a political constitution. In invoking parliamentary sovereignty,
opponents of the referendum attempted to deny this political force, asserting
that parliamentarians should decide for themselves whether the U.K. should
remain. They misunderstood parliamentary sovereignty—not for the first or
last time—wrongly confusing Parliament’s legally unlimited law-making
authority with the political morality of representative democracy. 19
In bolstering the argument for Parliament to defy the referendum, some
argued that it had been unfairly framed and carried out. That is, they
challenged the justice of the franchise, of who was entitled to vote and how
their votes had been counted. 20 The 2015 legislation adopted the same
franchise as a general election, which meant that EU nationals (other than
the Irish and Maltese) and those aged under 18 years old were unable to vote.
Across the U.K., a majority of voters living in England and Wales had voted
to leave, whereas the opposite was true in Northern Ireland and Scotland.
Finally, the referendum did not require a minimum turnout or a supermajority in favour of leaving.
This franchise was unfair, the argument ran, because the referendum
affected EU nationals and those under 18 years old, because the integrity of
the U.K. should have required majorities in each part of the U.K., and
because a major constitutional change should not turn on majority vote
alone. This was a very weak argument. 21 Adopting the general election
franchise was the only salient, fair option. No nation-state should let the
decision on whether to exercise its treaty right to withdraw from a treatybased organisation, including a partial state like the EU, turn on the choices
of non-citizens who have an interest in the U.K.’s continuing membership
of that organisation. The argument that it was unfair to exclude under 18year-olds (particularly 16 to 18-year-olds) from the vote simply begged the
question that voting to leave the EU prejudiced their interests. For those who
voted to leave, the calculus was that leaving the EU was good for the
country, the young included. The referendum was a U.K.-wide decision in
which each voter’s vote was counted equally and any suggestion that the
votes of the elderly, or the English, should count for less was risible.
Likewise, the turnout had been comparable to or higher than recent general
elections and no super-majority requirement had been imposed or perhaps
could fairly have been imposed.
The idea that the referendum had been intended only to be advisory was
hopeless. The more measured argument was not that the referendum was not
a popular decision to leave the EU, but that the decision was incomplete,
precisely because it did not settle the mode of exit. Therefore, the argument
ran, one could not rely on the referendum to support any particular form of
withdrawal from the EU, and it would be reasonable to put the question of
exit to the people again, once a form of exit had been clarified, which is to
say negotiated. Some on the Leave side had floated the idea, in advance of
19

Ekins, supra note 4.
Jo Shaw, The Quintessentially Democratic Act? Democracy, Political Community and Citizenship
in and After the UK’s EU Referendum of June 2016, 39 J. OF EUR. INTEGRATION 559 (2017).
21 Richard Ekins, The Legitimacy of the Brexit Referendum, UK C ONST. L. ASS’N (June 29,
2016),https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/29/richard-ekins-the-legitimacy-of-the-brexitreferendum/.
20
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the referendum, that one might have two referendums, one on the principle
of leaving and a second on the detail. But this had not been taken up and the
whole premise, on both sides, of the campaign was that it settled the question
of whether the U.K. would leave the EU. Holding a second referendum
would have broken faith with the electorate.
It is true that the referendum did not specify the future relationship
between the U.K. and the EU after exit—the various ideas floated by those
who led the campaign to leave were not the commitments of a party of
government and quite what lay ahead remained uncertain. So, the argument
that the referendum settled less than some claimed had some merit. But the
argument that it settled very little was a gross overstatement. Rather, it was
a decision of the people, per a referendum held by way of Act of Parliament,
that the U.K. should leave the EU. How best to leave was for others to
decide, but of course there was an obvious political imperative to do so in a
way that addressed widespread popular concerns about membership of the
EU. It did not follow, as some maintained, that the reasoning of the 52% had
been made inviolate, such that the 48% were excluded from involvement in
further public deliberation. On the contrary, the imperative for
parliamentarians was obviously to implement the decision to leave in
whatever way would best secure the common good and maximise popular
consent for the decision, including across the country at large. In reasoning
to this end, the question arose how important it was for the U.K.’s
withdrawal from the EU to involve ending free movement, severing the
continuing jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
and subjection to EU law more generally, and ending payments. Each of
these points had loomed very large in the campaign.
David Cameron was succeeded by Theresa May. She had campaigned,
very half-heartedly,22 for Remain but took up office on the premise (and
promise) that the government she would lead would be wholly committed to
honouring the referendum result. The frequency and tone of attempts to
delegitimate the referendum, including on the part of some parliamentarians
(although most were more measured, or at least stunned and relatively
silent), made it rational for the government to defend the legitimacy of the
referendum and to pledge firmly to implement the will of the people. This
was rational and honourable, even if it was certainly true that much had yet
to be decided. The ferocity of the post-referendum discussion, in which the
legitimacy of the referendum was expressly called into question, distorted
public deliberation. Instead of the question being how should the U.K. leave,
the question continued to be should it leave at all. Relatedly, for many
commentators, including, in particular, many lawyers and (former) civil
servants, in view of the extent of European integration, there was no good
way in which to leave, such that the U.K. should not leave at all or the people
should be invited to vote again when the difficulty of leaving became clear
to them. In sharp contrast, for many who voted to leave, the difficulty of
withdrawing from the EU confirmed the need to withdraw and the argument
that withdrawal was unfeasible sounded awfully similar to the argument,
during the referendum campaign, that withdrawal would be too costly.
Remain never articulated a slogan with anything like the force of “take back
22

She gave only one speech during the campaign, which was memorable mostly for its argument
that while EU membership might be justified, barely and on balance, the UK should instead
withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights. See Theresa May, The United
Kingdom, the European Union and our place in the world (Apr. 25, 2016) (Institute of Mechanical
Engineers, London), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretarys-speech-on-the-ukeu-and-our-place-in-the-world.
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control,” but its tacit slogan had been “resistance is futile.” Its echo was to
be heard years after the referendum.
In the months and years that followed the June 2016 referendum,
questions continued to be asked about how far Parliament should take itself
to be bound by the result. The unsound assertion that calling the referendum
had been improper, and that it had been unfairly framed and fought,
informed the views of many well-placed persons in the subsequent crisis.
This concern bled into objections to the merits of withdrawal, which
continued often to be depicted as an ill-informed, morally dubious decision.
For Dominic Grieve MP QC, former Attorney General and central player in
the long crisis, the decision to leave the EU was a revolution, but a revolution
initiated without a revolutionary government. 23 His understanding of the
constitutional significance of the U.K. leaving the EU was rather overstated,
and certainly it ran hand in hand with a confidence that leaving the EU was
a dreadful idea, but what is striking is his assumption, which became clearer
as time passed, that implementing the referendum required and involved
departing from the norms of constitutional government. This assumption
framed how resistance to withdrawal was later understood (viz., to resist the
government’s attempts to honour the referendum was to prevent
implementation of a foolish decision and to vindicate the historic
constitution).
Vernon Bogdanor has argued that the significance of the referendum
was to substitute the principle of popular sovereignty for parliamentary
sovereignty, reasoning that parliamentarians were for the first time being
forced by the people to carry out a policy with which they disagreed. 24 This
analysis overlooks the long-standing significance of popular pressure on
Parliament, with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty not entailing that
parliamentarians are free to ignore the public. However, it is true that
difficulties arise when political institutions invite the electorate to make a
decision without being willing to carry out that decision once made,
especially when many further decisions are required in consequence. The
risk, which did partly manifest itself over time, was that no one in high office
would be willing to take responsibility for the decision to leave the EU,
instead blaming the people for the decision. In the wake of the referendum,
the (new) government did take responsibility, but this commitment waned
over time, as did the willingness of a stable parliamentary majority to take
responsibility and to act responsibly.

III. TRIGGERING ARTICLE 50
The referendum result clearly did not itself remove the U.K. from the
EU. The 2015 Act made provision for the referendum but did not attach to
the outcome of the referendum any particular legal consequences (viz., it did
not change any person’s legal powers or duties). For the U.K. to leave the
EU, some further action would be required. Whereas it was doubtless always
possible for the U.K., as a sovereign state, to withdraw from the EU treaties
and thus cease to be an EU member state, Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty
had since 2009 provided a procedure for withdrawal. Article 50 is brief and
was not expected ever to be invoked. It provides in relevant part:
Dominic Grieve, Revolution Without End?: A Politician’s View of Brexit, (June 28, 2018)
(unpublished lecture) (presented at The 20th Burrell Competition Lecture and Reception).
24 Vernon Bogdanor, Europe and the Sovereignty of the People, 87 POL. Q. 348 (2016).
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1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from
the Union in accordance with its own constitutional
requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall
notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of
the guidelines provided by the European Council, the
Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that
State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal,
taking account of the framework for its future relationship
with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in
accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded
on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a
qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the
European Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in
question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal
agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification
referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in
agreement with the Member State concerned,
unanimously decides to extend this period. 25
During the referendum campaign, the Prime Minister had said that if the
country voted to leave, he would trigger Article 50 on June 24 by writing to
notify the European Council that the U.K. had decided to withdraw from the
EU. Was this a solemn promise to the electorate or a threat that a vote to
leave would immediately plunge the U.K. into political chaos? I am not
entirely sure. The point was certainly to emphasise that the vote was final.
Perhaps triggering Article 50 on June 24 would have been irresponsible,
especially taken in combination with his June 24 resignation and the
(unconscionable) failure of the government to have prepared to leave, for it
would have left the U.K. without an effective government ready to engage
in negotiations under Article 50(2). On this view, the Prime Minister was
right to leave to a new government the decision when exactly to trigger
Article 50, a decision ideally made once it had clarified its negotiating aims
and so forth. Alternatively, triggering Article 50 immediately may have
minimised much of the political difficulty that followed, including difficulty
in the conduct of the negotiations themselves.
In late June 2016, I published a defence of the legitimacy of the
referendum, taking issue with some of the early, and extraordinary, attacks
on the referendum and on the electorate.26 My initial draft asserted that it
would have been constitutionally legitimate, whether prudent or not, for the
Prime Minister on June 24 to have notified the European Council that the
U.K. had decided to leave the EU, precisely because the referendum vote
was a mandate so to do. There was no need, in other words, to await a further
debate in Parliament about whether or when to leave. I excised this assertion
from the final published article on the grounds that it may have been more
contestable than I at first anticipated, and thus a distraction from my main

25

The Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306); the Lisbon Treaty came into force on Dec.
1, 2009.
26 Ekins, supra note 21.
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line of argument (which was controversial enough), and because the
publication of an article by three colleagues gave me pause.
The article argued that it was not lawful for the Prime Minister to trigger
Article 50 unless and until Parliament enacted legislation authorising this
course of action.27 That is, the government could not rely on the prerogative
to conduct foreign policy to justify triggering Article 50, notwithstanding
that Article 50 was a U.K. treaty right (viz., a right to begin a process to
withdraw from other treaty commitments). The authors reasoned that the
European Communities Act 1972—the long title of which they misquoted
and therefore wholly misunderstood—had required the U.K. to be a member
of the EU, that triggering Article 50 would end the application of EU law in
the U.K. and thus change domestic law, and that there was no prerogative
power to change domestic law by fiat.
This article was very widely read and its argument taken up by Lord
Pannick QC in The Times. Litigation was initiated seeking an order that
Article 50 could not be triggered without legislation. This litigation was
extremely important to those who hoped to discredit the referendum and to
persuade Parliament either to ignore it or, more plausibly, to require a second
referendum before the U.K. were to leave the EU. The government had made
clear that it intended to trigger Article 50 and that it understood itself to have
lawful power so to do, without the need for fresh legislation. Litigation was
necessary if the government was to be forced, or at least forced by those
outside Parliament and especially the House of Commons, to put the
question of whether to leave to Parliament. Requiring parliamentary
approval by way of legislation had two apparent advantages: first, it made it
possible for a parliamentary majority, including even a majority in the
unelected upper house, to block withdrawal, and second, at a minimum it
introduced considerable delay. The importance of delay is that it was widely
believed, by an articulate minority, that simply the prospect of leaving the
EU would cause the economy to founder and the British people to come to
their senses. In other words, delay was a means to frustrate withdrawal.
Why did the government maintain that it had lawful authority to trigger
Article 50 without needing to seek fresh legislation? Perhaps because the
government is—and government lawyers are—predisposed to maintain the
scope of the prerogative and to look askance at arguments that it has been
swept away. Perhaps also because the prerogative clearly did extend to
triggering Article 50, with the arguments raised in the article in question,
and taken up in the litigation, appearing barely arguable and strained. There
had been no suggestion before June 24 that the government lacked legal
power to trigger Article 50, despite the Prime Minister’s public declaration
that he would do exactly this immediately after a vote to leave. But more
than this, the likely reason is that the government, under the leadership of
the new Prime Minister Theresa May, had committed itself forcefully to
honouring the referendum, to leaving the EU, and was not willing to run the
risk of a cross-party coalition in Parliament rejecting this. It must have
seemed to the government—it did to me at the time—a real risk that a
parliamentary majority would be mobilised to reject the referendum’s
outcome. The government would reasonably have wanted to avoid this
outcome, not only because this would make its position untenable but also

Nick Barber et al., Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable Role, UK CONST.
L. ASS’ N (June 27, 2016), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickmanand-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/.
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because Parliament would be acting wrongly in so doing and trust in
democracy would have been put in doubt.
Still, there was a good constitutional case to be made for the government
to seek express approval from the Houses of Parliament, or at least the
Commons, to the course of action it intended to undertake. Putting the point
at a minimum, Article 50 not having been triggered immediately after the
referendum vote, it was reasonable for the government to make clear that it
intended in the future to trigger Article 50 and to provide an opportunity for
the Commons to withdraw its confidence in the government accordingly.
This was and is the constitutionally proper route for Parliament to maintain
control over the government’s use of the prerogative (viz., only sustaining
in office a government in which it continues to have confidence). The
Constitution Committee of the House of Lords declined to comment on the
pending Miller litigation, as it came to be known, but recommended that the
government consider seeking express support of both Houses of Parliament,
either by resolutions in each House or by way of a short Act of Parliament. 28
The Committee reasoned, plausibly, that this would help to reinforce the
legitimacy of the decision to trigger Article 50 and might even strengthen
the U.K.’s position in relation to the EU, on the premise that domestic
uncertainty and division would weaken that position. This was a reasonable
analysis and indeed in due course, on the third day of the Supreme Court
hearing in December 2016, the government did move a resolution in the
Commons, which was approved by overwhelming majority, supporting its
intention to trigger Article 50 by March 31, 2017, at latest.
By this point in time, the Divisional Court had already ruled that the
prerogative did not extend to triggering Article 50.29 The Divisional Court’s
judgment was a source of immense public controversy, as well as endless
academic commentary and debate. Many scholars and lawyers took issue
with the Court’s reasoning and the division was not reducible to the question
of pro- or anti-Brexit sentiment. Still, it was clear that most lawyers, or at a
minimum most high-profile and publicly (politically) active lawyers,
opposed withdrawal from the EU and supported the litigation. This was
made very clear in the letter from more than a thousand barristers, made
public on 11 July 2016, which asserted that the government had no lawful
power to trigger Article 50 and called for a royal commission to investigate
mistruths and to determine how best to respond to the “advisory”
referendum.30 The letter was political action, not legal analysis. It was
special pleading and a misuse of professional authority. It helped inflame
the fears of millions of voters, and many in government and Parliament, that
a concerted effort was underway to frustrate the outcome of the vote. (So
too, in a smaller way, did various absurd proposals to invite courts (a) to
forbid the Prime Minister from taking the referendum to be morally binding;
(b) to declare implementation of the referendum irrational and thence
unlawful; or (c) to quash the referendum, and the 2015 Act itself, as
motivated by an improper political purpose.)31

28

HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, THE INVOKING OF ARTICLE 50,
HL Paper 44 (2016).
29 R (Miller and Dos Santos) v Sec’y of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC (Admin)
2768.
30 Richard Ekins & Graham Gee, Miller, Constitutional Realism, and the Politics of Brexit, in T HE
UK C ONSTITUTION AFTER: BREXIT AND BEYOND 249 (2018).
31 For criticism, see Richard Ekins, Brexit and Judicial Power, POL’Y EXCHANGE (Jul. 21,
2016),https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/r-ekins-brexit-and-judicialpower-21-july-2016.pdf.
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The Divisional Court’s November 2016 judgment clearly did not itself
prevent (block) withdrawal from the EU. The litigation was never capable
of realising this end, even if this is also clearly why the litigation attracted
such enormous interest and support and why it moved markets. Still, it is no
surprise that it generated high feelings and much overheated political
criticism. The low-point was the infamous Daily Mail headline “Enemies of
the People.” The headline was much criticised, although the Lord
Chancellor, Liz Truss, was slow to criticise it and was herself heavily
criticised in turn. The Daily Mail’s criticism was unfair. The Divisional
Court made a mistake; it had not joined a conspiracy. The main significance
of the Daily Mail’s criticism was to encourage a siege mentality on the part
of many lawyers and judges. It is impossible to know if this made it more
likely that a majority of Supreme Court judges would uphold the Divisional
Court’s judgment, bravely defying the mob or at least defending their
embattled colleagues. It certainly reinforced the narrative that withdrawal
from the EU either was, or had unleashed, a kind of populist revolution
which would devour the institutions that Leavers (and Conservatives?)
otherwise claimed to respect. This was to be a major part of the (self-serving)
constitutional narrative that followed.
The Miller litigation was arguable, but only barely. One of my
colleagues, an eminent public law scholar (who did not vote for withdrawal
from the EU), reasoned that it was so weak that it should have been denied
permission to proceed to a full hearing. I think the claim was strong enough
to warrant a hearing, but that it should then have been roundly rejected. The
reason it succeeded, unanimously in the Divisional Court and by a majority
of eight to three in the Supreme Court, was not because the judges voted
their politics (I expect it would have been unanimous in the Supreme Court
if that had been the case), but because too many of them accepted a mistaken
narrative. The litigation was framed, cannily, as a defence of parliamentary
sovereignty against an over-mighty executive, resonant with the long
parliamentary struggle against royal power. Hence, the prerogative power to
conduct foreign policy, a central executive power in any constitution, was
discussed as an ancient, royal prerogative, complete with invocation of
clanking chains. Theresa May was routinely compared with Charles I or
Henry VIII, and the political and constitutional significance of the
referendum and the confidence of the House of Commons was ignored.
The decision of the House of Commons in December expressly to
support triggering Article 50 took much of the political tension out of the
Supreme Court litigation. It perhaps emboldened members of the Court to
think that their ruling would not be pivotal if, as seemed likely by this stage,
the government would be able to secure legislation and Article 50 would be
duly triggered. Tempers had cooled somewhat by late January 2017,
certainly in comparison with early November 2016, and the Supreme
Court’s judgment attracted much less public ire. 32 On the merits, the
majority wrongly conflated its perception of good constitutional practice
with requirements of constitutional law, despite only having authority to
uphold the latter.33 The central premise of the majority judgment, aside from
its bad misreading of the way in which EU law comes to force in domestic
U.K. law, was the assertion that constitutionally important decisions require
an Act of Parliament. This was not and never had been the law. Neither was
R (Miller and Dos Santos) v Sec’y of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.
Richard Ekins, Constitutional Practice and Principle in the Article 50 Litigation, 133 L. Q. REV.
347 (2017).
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it a requirement of convention. The minority argued forcefully that it was
not for the courts to turn questions about good constitutional practice into
justiciable law. The eloquence and force of the minority dissent contributed
to the generally calm public reception of the judgment, for it made clear that
the arguments had been aired. The Daily Mail ran a self-mocking headline
entitled “Champions of the People,” profiling the three dissenting judges,
whom it had otherwise (understandably) suspected of being Europhiles.
The upshot of the Supreme Court’s judgment was that a short Bill was
introduced to authorise the Prime Minister to trigger Article 50. The House
of Commons assented by an overwhelming majority; some in the House of
Lords were minded to amend the Bill in far-reaching ways, or even to refuse
passage of the Bill, but in the end cooler heads prevailed and it was enacted
without amendment. 34 Strictly, the main consequence of the Supreme
Court’s judgment, requiring legislation be enacted before Article 50 was
triggered, was that the House of Lords was empowered to frustrate
withdrawal or at least to delay it for up to one year if the Parliament Acts
1911 and 1949 had to be invoked. But in reality, Parliament acted promptly
and rightly to empower the government to act. The legislation was a
formality. Many commentators lamented Parliament's failure to take up the
opportunity Miller had won for them, an opportunity to stipulate by
legislation the government’s negotiating strategy or to impose conditions.
This was always an unreal hope. Parliament lacked the capacity to manage
the government’s negotiating strategy in advance, even if it of course
retained capacity to scrutinise the government’s actions as time went by. It
may well have been a mistake to trigger Article 50 in March, before the
government had formed or agreed to a strategy for negotiations. However,
it was a mistake forced by the political reality that the government needed
to bring a halt to the question of whether the U.K. should withdraw by
beginning the process that meant it would withdraw. The frenzied response
to the referendum explains the decision to trigger relatively quickly.
In one sense, the dispute about the authority to trigger Article 50 was a
damp squib signifying nothing. Miller may have been a pyrrhic victory
insofar as commencing withdrawal by way of an Act of Parliament helped
to cement its legitimacy, complicating the prospect of its cancellation by a
later government. The judgment insisted on an empty formality, which
would have been disastrous if the House of Lords had delayed matters by a
year. Almost three years later, in September 2019, Helen Mountfield QC,
one of the successful counsel in Miller, wrongly recalled the Miller
judgment as having secured for Parliament important controls over the
subsequent Brexit process, controls that were pivotal in avoiding a no-deal
exit in early 2019.35 It was not so; Mountfield confused the 2017 Act, which
was as brief as can be, with the 2018 legislation, which is rather more
extensive. The significance of the Miller judgment was not that it won for
Parliament an opportunity for participation it otherwise lacked, but that it
gave an outlet to frustrated political energy and marked out a strategy
pursued in the subsequent years, one centring on tactical recourse to courts,
injured protestations about institutions (especially courts) under attack from
shameless populists, and strategic defences of the rights and “sovereignty”
of Parliament against a heavy-handed executive. This narrative dampened
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European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 c. 9.
BBC Radio 5 Live Interview with Richard Ekins and Helen Mountfield QC (Sep. 25, 2019); we
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down across the remainder of 2017, but returned in 2018 and, with a
vengeance, in 2019.

IV. LEGISLATING ABOUT BREXIT
The main political event of 2017 was not the triggering of Article 50,
which followed from the referendum and from resolution of the Commons,
but the June general election. The Conservative Party lost its small majority
in the Commons and the government remained in office only with the
support of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The government had
attempted to frame the election, and had probably persuaded itself to propose
it, as necessary to return a substantial parliamentary majority that would
make possible the U.K.’s smooth withdrawal from the EU. The irony is
twofold. First, the election’s outcome made this much more difficult,
returning a Parliament in which divisions about whether, after all, to
withdraw from the EU would loom large. Second, many voters seem to have
reasoned that this was not, after all, a Brexit election but was instead the first
post-Brexit election, with voting patterns turning on other matters. Why
might voters (wrongly, but understandably) have reasoned in this way? The
enactment of the 2017 legislation and the triggering of Article 50 suggested
that the question of whether the U.K. would withdraw from the EU had been
decisively settled. And both the main political parties, who secured 85% of
the vote between them (the highest figure for many general elections),
campaigned on commitments to deliver withdrawal, to end free movement
of persons, and so on.
Theresa May’s government was badly crippled by the 2017 election
result. The Opposition had been shown to be much more electorally
dangerous (popular) than expected and the government’s working majority,
with DUP support, was thin indeed. Nonetheless, the government went on
to secure enactment of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which
made legislative provision for domestic law after Brexit, largely by retaining
EU law as a special kind of domestic law. The Act was hard fought in the
Houses of Parliament with some parliamentarians arguing that it conferred
unconstitutional powers on ministers to change the law in far-reaching ways.
The criticism was overstated and failed to address the technical complexity
of adjusting retained EU law, especially in view of uncertainty about what,
if any, deal the U.K. would conclude with the EU.
More important than the ministerial powers to make secondary
legislation in preparation for withdrawal were the procedures introduced
into the Act in the event of a failure to conclude a deal with the EU. The
government saw off, narrowly, an attempt, led by Dominic Grieve MP, to
empower the House of Commons itself to take over negotiations if the
government failed to reach a deal. However, the legislation was amended to
require the government, if a deal could not be reached by a certain date or if
the Commons refused to support the deal, to come forward with further
proposals, which the House should have the opportunity to debate. The
debate was to be framed by the government tabling a motion in neutral
terms, which is an unamendable motion. This was to prove pivotal in
relations between government and Parliament in early 2019. Also important
was the Act’s provision that a new Act of Parliament would be required to
implement any deal between the U.K. and the EU: this made clear that the
legal default was exit without a deal, which encouraged many MPs to think,
reasonably enough, that this could be achieved by inaction.
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Article 50 having been triggered on March 29, 2017, the U.K. was on
track to leave the EU by March 29, 2019 at latest, either with a withdrawal
agreement, if such could be concluded, or without one. Withdrawal was the
legal default. Again, Parliament had made legal provision, in the 2018 Act,
for withdrawal without a deal; if there was to be a deal, it would require
further legislation.
The premise of the Miller litigation had been that once Article 50 was
triggered, the U.K.’s exit from the EU, and the termination of rights and
duties under the EU Treaties, would follow inexorably. It suited the
government and the claimants to accept the premise in this litigation, but
doubt remained as to whether the U.K. had the freedom in EU law
unilaterally to revoke its Article 50 notice. The government’s position
remained that it was committed to honouring the referendum’s outcome and
that the U.K. would leave the EU on March 29, 2019 at latest, preferably
with a deal but without a deal if need be. This position was to be challenged,
and reversed, by way of unconstitutional parliamentary action.
In late 2018, the Scottish courts referred to the Court of Justice of the
EU (“CJEU”) the question of whether a member state may unilaterally
revoke an Article 50 notice. Litigation to secure this reference had not been
straightforward. The Scottish litigation was the final stop in an extended
forum-shopping exercise, taking in London, Dublin, and the Netherlands. 36
Failing at first instance, the challenge for the claimants was to establish that
there was a dispute which required a reference to be made to the CJEU. The
Inner House of the Court of Session (effectively the Scottish court of appeal)
accepted the argument that it had a constitutional responsibility to advise the
Houses of Parliament about the law, including the law about unilateral
revocation of the EU, precisely because this advice might prove pivotal in
parliamentary deliberation and action. 37 The court at first instance had
concluded that it had no jurisdiction because there was no dispute requiring
determination of any question of law and the courts had no general
declaratory jurisdiction, still less one to advise Parliament about matters
pertaining to its deliberations. Indeed, parliamentary privilege (and Article
9 of the Bill of Rights 1689) provided a reason to dismiss any application
that sought to inform or interfere with possible or contemplated
parliamentary proceedings.
The government appealed to the Supreme Court, attempting to block the
reference to the CJEU, but the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the
Court had no appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the Inner House in
relation to interim proceedings. Formally, the reference to the CJEU was a
step in the Scottish litigation, after which it would be for the Inner House to
make a final ruling, which would then be subject to appeal. But of course,
the whole point of the litigation was to secure the reference: once the
reference had been made the litigation was effectively at an end. The
Supreme Court should have recognised this reality and heard the appeal.
The CJEU ruled that unilateral revocation was lawful, provided the
member state really meant it (viz., it was unequivocal and unconditional).
The CJEU did not impose further conditions, thus in effect lowering the
perceived cost of remaining in the EU after all. It would always have been
possible to cancel the Article 50 notice by mutual agreement, but, absent the
36
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CJEU’s ruling on unilateral revocation, this would in practice have
empowered the EU27 to demand concessions, including surrender of the
U.K.’s rebate and opt-outs from the Schengen Area and common currency.
Even after the CJEU judgment, the political reality remained that the U.K.
would have had difficulty cancelling its Article 50 notice without some
assurances that its political position within the EU would not be
compromised, but it is certainly true that the judgment, as intended,
encouraged parliamentarians to contemplate revocation. In other words, the
judgment helped undermine the perception that Parliament’s options were
either to approve a withdrawal agreement or to see the U.K. leave without
an agreement. But these were still the only honourable options; Parliament
should not have considered revocation a live option. In practice, it was never
supported as an option in the House of Commons by anything approaching
a majority.
In late 2018, the government announced that a withdrawal agreement
had been negotiated. However, the agreement could not be finalised, in
accordance with the 2018 Act, unless and until it was approved by a majority
of the House of Commons in a so-called “meaningful vote.” In addition, a
further Act of Parliament would be required to give the withdrawal
agreement force in U.K. domestic law before ratification was possible. The
agreement was opposed not only by the Opposition but also by many
Conservative MPs, some on the grounds that the agreement was inadequate
and should be renegotiated, or that the U.K. should simply leave without a
deal, or that the agreement should be put to the people in a referendum, with
the alternative being to remain in the EU. The Opposition had no grounds
on which to reject the agreement save to assert that a Labour government
would (somehow, in ways unspecified) negotiate a better deal. The
government failed to secure a majority in the first meaningful vote. More
were to follow, with the government increasing its vote in the Commons and
yet failing to reach a majority.
One major ground of parliamentary concern, which lead the DUP and
many Tory MPs to oppose the deal, was the fear that the agreement’s
Protocol for Northern Ireland, the so-called “backstop,” risked locking the
U.K. into permanent subjection to EU law. Minimising this risk, and the
perception of such risk, was the focus of considerable activity between the
U.K. and EU in early 2019.38 The risk was indeed reduced and the
government came closer to securing a majority. However, a combination of
Conservative MPs, some intent on a second referendum and revocation and
others intent on a no-deal exit, voted with (most of) the Opposition to defeat
the motion. For the latter (larger) group of Conservative MPs, the continuing
failure to approve the withdrawal agreement meant that the March 29
deadline approached, with the legal default of no-deal exit. This would either
encourage the EU to bend or would result in exit without subjection to
Theresa May’s unacceptable deal. For the former group of Conservative
MPs, no-deal exit was considerably worse than the deal and the question
they faced was how to prevent exit at all.
See generally Guglielmo Verdirame, et al., How to Exit the Backstop, POL’ Y EXCHANGE (Dec. 7,
2018), https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/How-to-Exit-the-Backstop.pdf;
Guglielmo Verdirame & Richard Ekins, Strengthening the UK’s Position on the Backstop, POL’ Y
EXCHANGE
(Jan.
29,
2019),
https://policyexchange.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/Strengthening-the-UKs-position-on-the-Backstop.pdf;
Guglielmo
Verdirame, et al., A Second Look: The UK’s legal position in relation to the backstop, POL’Y
EXCHANGE (Mar. 15, 2019), https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/A-SecondLook.pdf.
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The withdrawal agreement was unloved, but it provided a means for
orderly exit. It should have been approved, even if only reluctantly, by all
those MPs (an overwhelming majority) who insisted that they intended to
honour the referendum and who feared a no-deal exit. As for the minority of
MPs who were enthusiasts for a no-deal exit, their refusal to support the
withdrawal agreement was in one way rational and principled, and in another
way reckless in the extreme. For it was obvious that a parliamentary majority
opposed a no-deal exit and that a majority might take radical action to
prevent it; relatedly, it was not obvious that the government’s resolve to
leave without a deal if need be would endure. In failing to support the
agreement this minority (the ERG, and later the members of the ERG most
committed to a no deal exit: the so-called Spartans) risked ending up with
no Brexit at all. The post-2017 parliamentary arithmetic thus made it very
difficult for the government to secure majority support for the agreement,
despite the nominal willingness of most MPs not to frustrate withdrawal.
Parliament’s refusal to accept the agreement had a predictable radicalising
effect, contributing to the constitutional crises that followed.

V. THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TAKES CONTROL
If the choice before Parliament had been to approve the withdrawal
agreement or to see the U.K. leave without a deal on March 29, 2019, which
was after all the legal default, the agreement would have been approved. The
government attempted to frame this as the choice before Parliament, partly
by stressing that it would not apply for an extension to the Article 50 process
(and that there was no guarantee the EU27 would agree to an extension). On
March 22, the government did apply for a short extension to April 12, hoping
that MPs would in the end support the withdrawal agreement rather than risk
a no-deal exit. However, what followed was an unconstitutional takeover of
government by a cross-party coalition of MPs aiming to avoid a no-deal exit,
or it was to prevent withdrawal with a deal and instead to play for time and
for a second referendum. The takeover involved backbench MPs taking
control of the order paper, which is to say the agenda of the House of
Commons, removing the initiative from the government.
On December 4, 2018, the first debate under the 2018 Act to approve
the withdrawal agreement began, in accordance with a business motion
approved by the House of Commons. The Speaker allowed Dominic Grieve
MP to successfully move an amendment disapplying Standing Orders of the
House so that any motion on proposals from the government if the deal was
rejected would be amendable, contrary to the intention of the 2018 Act. This
was surprising, not only because the amendment would normally have been
disallowed as outside the scope of the motion, but also because it re-opened
a question already decided in the same Session during proceedings on the
Bill for the 2018 Act and because it sought to use a motion of the House of
Commons effectively to amend an Act passed by both Houses. The debate
on the deal was abandoned before reaching a conclusion and was resumed
in January. On the resumption of the debate, the Speaker again allowed Mr.
Grieve successfully to move another amendment changing the timings for
the stages of the 2018 Act proceedings. This was open to all the same
objections as his previous amendment and also, on the normally understood
wording of the House’s earlier resolution, was expressly forbidden by it.
Against official advice, the Speaker refused to apply that prohibition.

64

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. XII:1

What was to follow were various attempts to “take control” using the
amendability of the approval motion or, as a result of the Grieve
amendments, of the motion relating to the Government’s proposal in
response to the votes rejecting the deal. These attempts consisted in
amendments proposing the disapplication of SO14 to certain business,
together with the introduction of Bills which could have formed the subjectmatter of that business. On March 25, the agenda was seized and was used
to hold a series of indicative votes about what should be done, including
seeking a customs union with the EU, holding a second referendum,
revoking the Article 50 notice, and so on. The options were underspecified
and there were majorities against them all. Insofar as the attempts to take
control were intended to culminate in proposals for legislation to require a
second referendum they faced another objection, namely that Standing
Orders require the consent of the government to legislation that has financial
implications—a standing order that even the current Erskine May describes
as of the highest constitutional importance. The same objection could be
made to legislation requiring the government to apply for an Article 50
extension. However, there were reasons to fear that the rogue Speaker would
fail to uphold these procedural rules.
On March 31, anticipating introduction of the Cooper-Letwin Bill to
force the government to apply for an Article 50 extension, Sir Stephen Laws
and I published an article arguing that the parliamentary manoeuvres in
question were endangering constitutional government.39 That is, the various
departures from parliamentary procedure, and from the 2018 Act itself, were
unjustified and were being used to displace the government from its rightful
place in the constitution. It was improper for a cross-party coalition of MPs
to attempt to form a government without removing from office the
government, and thus hiding from political and electoral accountability.
Further, unless and until the Commons withdrew its confidence from the
government, the government was entitled to insist on its constitutional
position, to lead the agenda of the House and not to be forced to take
responsibility for initiatives that the rules of the House entitled it to block.
We argued further that the government was not powerless in this exchange
and that the subversion of constitutional government might well provoke the
government, rationally enough, to respond by proroguing Parliament or even
to advise Her Majesty to withhold assent to legislation. Avoiding such
conflict was a further reason for MPs to refrain from unconstitutional
takeover of government.
The point of our intervention was certainly not to seek a no-deal exit.
Both Sir Stephen and I had argued extensively that the apparent reasons to
refuse to support the withdrawal agreement, namely the risk of the backstop
being permanent by default, were misconceived. 40 I had argued separately
that Parliament should not contemplate remaining in the EU. Parliamentary
sovereignty was a rule about law-making competence and did not justify
parliamentarians in failing to honour their promises and breaking faith with
the electorate.41 If MPs were opposed to a no-deal exit, they should support
the withdrawal agreement that had been reached between the U.K. and the
Richard Ekins & Stephen Laws, Endangering Constitutional Government, POL’Y EXCHANGE
(2019), https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Endangering-ConstitutionalGovernment.pdf.
40 Verdirame, et al., supra note 38.
41 Richard Ekins, Forget specious arguments about sovereignty, Parliament is honour-bound to
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EU. However, our argument did entail that MPs were not constitutionally
entitled to block exit by taking over government. They might reasonably
withdraw confidence in the government, but they might simply have left this
too late in order to prevent a no-deal exit, if the government refused,
notwithstanding political pressure, to apply for an Article 50 extension.
Many academics and lawyers responded to our intervention with
forceful denunciation, including dark invocations of the example of Schmitt
and the last days of Weimar. 42 The denunciations misunderstood our claims
about royal assent, which had relied on the long-standing and pre-existing
scholarly disagreements on point, and which did not constitute an argument
for assent to be withheld. On the contrary, our point was that departure from
constitutional norms, of the kind evident in the ongoing parliamentary
manoeuvres, risked provoking others either to use the tools at their disposal
or to respond in kind with unconstitutional action or both. Few academics
and lawyers, or at least those active in the public realm, seemed to express
any concern about those manoeuvres, and indeed they were greeted with
much sympathy and enthusiasm. This asymmetry is explicable, I suggest,
partly on grounds of ignorance about the history and principled foundations
of our political constitution and the parliamentary government for which it
provides. It was also explicable partly on the grounds of simple political
bias, for many of the academics and lawyers in question were partisans for
Remain. Relevant also was the force of the wider narrative about Brexit
(viz., that it had brought to light pre-existing failings of the U.K. constitution
or that it was bringing about the collapse of parliamentary democracy into
populism or worse).
The day after Sir Stephen and my intervention, John Finnis published
an article,43 relying in part on our analysis, in which he argued that the
government should head off the unfolding crisis in Parliament by proroguing
Parliament for two weeks. This would bring to an end one of the longest
sessions of Parliament in many years and would mean Parliament would
return to session only after the EU treaties had expired. That is, the U.K.
would leave the EU without a deal and the cross-party coalition would not
succeed in legislating to force the government to apply for an extension. If
a bill to this effect did pass both Houses, as seemed entirely possible, the
government might well advise Her Majesty to withhold assent, but better
that she not be put in this position. The government should spend the two
weeks in question focusing on preparations for a no-deal exit, making use of
their extensive secondary law-making powers. I am not entirely sure how
ready the U.K. was at this point, in legal terms, to leave the EU without a
deal or how far secondary law-making powers would have been open to
exercise without Parliament in session to approve regulations.
This was a bold proposal and attracted considerable negative attention. 44
In one sense it went wholly with the grain of the government’s own stated
policy, the undoing of which (by applying for a lengthy extension)
threatened to do grave damage to public trust. Likewise, parliamentary
42
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government does not entail that government must provide parliamentarians
with maximal opportunity to violate constitutional norms and to subvert
government and the public trust. The idea that Parliament ought to have been
free, up until 10:59 P.M. on April 12, to call halt was simply misconceived.
But Finnis’s proposal was too bold to be taken up by a government at war
with itself and politically and emotionally unprepared to take the U.K. out
of the EU without a deal. It would have been (and was) caricatured as a coup
and, in view of the possible complexity and difficulty of a no-deal exit,
would likely have been immensely politically controversial and tumultuous.
On balance, I think that it would not have been a prudent course of action
for the government to have taken, although the alternative course of action
was likewise most unappealing. Proroguing to kill a bill requiring an
application for an extension would have been less momentous.
The reaction to our intervention and to Finnis’s proposal was
memorable. The case for prorogation at this stage or even for advising royal
assent to be withheld from a bill requiring the government to seek extension
beyond April 12 would have been stronger still if Parliament had looked set
to legislate for a second referendum or to revoke the Article 50 notice. This
becomes especially evident since a bill to achieve either of those ends could
only have been procured by violating fundamental procedural norms about
government control of legislation with financial implications. The reaction
misunderstood the fact that decisions, by Act of Parliament, about whether
and on what terms the U.K. should leave the EU had been made in 2015,
2017, and 2018, such that there was no requirement for a further
parliamentary decision to approve leaving the EU without a deal. This was
the legal default, made so by unequivocal past choices of Parliament itself.
It was no part of parliamentary sovereignty that a cross-party coalition
should be able to displace the role of government within Parliament and
execute its will up until the 11th hour without supporting a government that
would take initiative and responsibility.
The refusal to accept the referendum result—the premise that whether
the U.K. should leave remained an open question—continued to be
significant. Equally significant was the sophomoric understanding of
parliamentary government and democracy adopted by so many otherwise
eminent persons, persons who showed no awareness that their
unconstitutional actions might provoke a reaction in kind and no concern
about public trust and keeping faith with the people. On the contrary, they
rushed to parody such concerns as proto-fascist and unconstitutional in turn.
They were in the grip of self-serving narrative that was to have (further)
consequences.
The government yielded under pressure, accepting the Cooper-Letwin
Bill,45 which set a clear precedent for further parliamentary seizure of the
initiative. It was a known fact that the Speaker had gone rogue and that a
cross-party coalition was ready to postpone (prevent) exit. Having breached
its commitment to the public, that the U.K. would leave the EU by March
29 (and then April 12, the date at which the short two-week extension came
to an end), political support for the Conservative Party began to collapse.
The collapse was made vivid in the European Parliament elections, which
the government had promised would never happen and in which the newly
created Brexit Party triumphed. The Conservative Party came neither second
nor third, but fourth, with fewer than 10% of the votes. With her party facing
an existential crisis, Theresa May resigned as leader.
45
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VI. THE PROROGATION CRISIS
The challenge facing whoever succeeded Theresa May as Prime
Minister was how to secure the U.K.’s withdrawal from the EU in the face
of hostile parliamentary arithmetic and in view of the Cooper-Letwin
precedent. In the course of the Conservative Party leadership contest,
Dominic Raab MP contemplated prorogation as a means to this end. Other
candidates decried this proposal, and it was never entirely clear what Raab
had in mind (viz., prorogation from September 3 through November 1 or
something much more limited?). If Parliament was prorogued, this might
prevent parliamentary efforts to force, especially by legislation, the
government to apply for an Article 50 extension. But it would also prevent
Parliament approving any new withdrawal agreement. That said, Parliament
could always be reconvened to consider and approve a new agreement.
Fearing that prorogation might derail a rerun of Cooper-Letwin,
backbench MPs set out to legislate about prorogation in the autumn. Their
vehicle for so doing was the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill,
which concerned progress towards restoration of devolution in Northern
Ireland and which imposed a duty on the Secretary of State to make a report
about progress. Taking over the Bill, a cross-party coalition made it a vehicle
to change abortion and same-sex marriage law in Northern Ireland and to
make prorogation much more difficult or much less effective. This was an
unconstitutional move, putting a bipartisan measure in relation to devolution
and the peace process to use to manage the government on an entirely
unrelated matter. The legislation was not straightforward to craft because
any measure that changed the royal prerogative, including limiting the power
to prorogue Parliament, would require Queen’s Consent (importantly
different to royal assent), which meant in practice that the government had
a procedural veto. 46 This restriction was duly evaded, partly by reliance on
the rogue Speaker and partly by framing the legislation not as a limit on the
power to prorogue but as making provision for recall if Parliament was
prorogued, so that Parliament would be in session for much of autumn, and
especially October, nominally to debate a report on Northern Ireland but in
reality to prevent a no-deal exit.
More precisely, the legislation required the Secretary of State to make a
report in early September and then another in early October and every
fortnight thereafter. If Parliament were prorogued on the relevant date, then
the government was obliged to exercise its statutory power, under the
Meeting of Parliaments Act 1797, to recall Parliament within five days of
what was otherwise the reporting date, with Parliament to remain in session
for five more working days. The legislation did not strictly prevent
prorogation, but it did make lengthy prorogation trickier. Strictly, it left open
exactly the kind of two-week prorogation that John Finnis had mooted in
April (viz., prorogation in mid-October until after the U.K. had left the EU
at 11pm on October 31).47 It also left open a prorogation for much of
Richard Ekins & Stephen Laws, Grieve’s plan to prevent prorogation is too clever by half,
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September. This legislation was procured immediately before the new Prime
Minister was appointed, and one might question whether the outgoing
government was as active as it ought to have been, including by asserting its
procedural rights. At the same time as the legislation was enacted, Gina
Miller and John Major (former Conservative Prime Minister) threatened to
bring legal proceedings against the government if Parliament were
prorogued. Joanna Cherry QC MP went one step further, initiating
proceedings in Scotland.
The Prime Minister disavowed prorogation as a means to secure the
U.K.’s withdrawal from the EU. But in late August he advised the Queen to
prorogue Parliament from the second week of September until mid-October.
The prorogation was compliant with the Northern Ireland (Executive
Formation etc.) Act 2019, but litigation immediately flared into action. The
public rationale for the prorogation was that the current session of
Parliament had been absurdly long and that it was time to start a new session,
which would open with a Queen’s Speech setting out an ambitious new
legislative agenda. The proposed prorogation would cost only a few days of
sitting time (because of the recess for party conference season), September
sittings were a novelty in any case, and reconvening before mid-October was
impractical. Plus, this would leave plenty of time in October for MPs to
scrutinise progress towards withdrawal. There were reasons to suspect this
was not the full explanation. Proroguing might help minimise the risk of
Cooper-Letwin II, although this prorogation would not make that impossible
and indeed might make it more likely. But prorogation would signal resolve,
might provoke political opponents to misstep or overreach, and would
strengthen the U.K.’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the EU. The decision
provoked immense political controversy, with much talk of the prorogation
being a “coup” or the death of democracy. The overheated rhetoric betrayed
a fear that the gambit might work.
The decision exposed the Queen to criticism. Some argued that she
should have refused the advice to prorogue Parliament. This criticism was
deeply unfair; the prorogation in question did not come close to the length
or circumstances in which Her Majesty might have a reserve power to refuse
the advice. Others argued that the prorogation was unconstitutional because
the Prime Minister did not really, or clearly, enjoy the confidence of the
Commons. The criticism was misplaced, not only because the vital point is
that confidence had not been withdrawn, but also because this prorogation
was not intended to avoid a loss of confidence and indeed made room for a
vote of no confidence to be called and lost. That is, the prorogation did not
proceed until after MPs and peers had just over a week of parliamentary
time. Strikingly, there was no move to withdraw confidence in the
government, likely because this would not have prevented a no-deal exit, but
also because there is no guarantee that the government would lose. Instead,
parliamentary time was mobilised, with help from the Speaker and in
departure from Standing Orders, to legislate to force the government to
apply for an extension if no deal was approved by October 19. The
legislation was fiercely opposed by the government, but various procedural
objections, including Queen’s Consent and financial responsibility, were
dismissed by the Speaker. The government maintained that the legislation
broke faith with the British people, would hamstring the U.K. in its
negotiations, and was an unconstitutional attempt by the House of Commons
to manage the conduct of foreign policy. Tory peers stood ready to filibuster
the bill but were stood down, apparently on the premise that the government
would abandon resistance in exchange for an early election, on October 14
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or 15. If this was the exchange, which is unclear, the Opposition did not
honour its part of the bargain, refusing to support a motion under the Fixedterm Parliaments Act to hold an early election.
Prorogation took place in the early hours of September 10. Courts at
first instance dismissed the litigation challenging the advice to prorogue and
the prorogation itself on the grounds that these were non-justiciable matters,
the constitutionality of which was not for courts to judge. Whether and for
how long to prorogue was a matter of high policy and the principle of
parliamentary sovereignty did not permit judges to review the decision to
prorogue. These orthodox judgments at first instance were reversed, first by
the Inner House in Scotland (by two of the judges who ruled in Wightman,
on referring Article 50’s revocability to the CJEU) and then in the Supreme
Court. The Inner House judgment moves from grand principle, otherwise
non-justiciable, to particular conclusions about the veracity of the Prime
Minister’s dealings with the Queen. 48 It is an unimpressive judgment, made
all the more so by its failure to specify whether the effect of its judgment is
that prorogation never happened or that Parliament should be recalled. The
Supreme Court judgment, handed down five days after a televised three-day
hearing, was astonishing. 49 It is intellectually threadbare, collapsing the
distinction between the scope of the prerogative and the manner of its
exercise, ignoring the relevant legal and constitutional history and
precedent, turning parliamentary accountability into an actionable legal
principle and transmuting parliamentary sovereignty into a ground to
interfere in high politics. The judgment is marred by overheated rhetoric, by
its irrational dismissal of tried and true political and practical constraints on
the power to prorogue, and the non sequitur of its argument that there should
be some legal restraint on prorogation, its recitation of some such statutory
restraints, and then its conclusion that because those restraints had not been
breached the court must invent another. It also evades (flouts) the 1689 Bill
of Rights’ prohibition on judicial interference in parliamentary
proceedings.50
The Supreme Court’s judgment brings together in a perfect storm the
series of misconceptions about the U.K. constitution in which social and
political elites have indulged since the process of withdrawal began. The
Court remade the law of the constitution, which forbad its intervention, in
order better to guard the (political) constitution, which it misunderstood. It
did so without attending to its unanimous ruling in Miller (No 1) that courts
are neither the guardians nor parents of convention. 51 Its reasoning is
transparently that of a court that is making new law, while aiming to obscure
to the general public that it is so doing. The quashing of the prorogation was
greeted by many enthusiasts for Remain as saving the constitution from
dictatorship. Many academic lawyers and parliamentarians have taken it to
be justified by fundamental principle. 52 It is not so. The Prime Minister and
Attorney General were quite right to resist the charge that they had acted
See also Richard Ekins, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Politics of Prorogation, POL’ Y
EXCHANGE (Sept. 16, 2019), https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/parliamentary-sovereigntyand-the-politics-of-prorogation/.
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48

70

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. XII:1

unlawfully and to maintain that the Supreme Court had misapplied the law.
The judgment gave victory in a political contest to the opponents of the
government but did not enable Parliament to do anything it had not done in
the days before prorogation. On its return, Parliament simply (and
disgracefully) refused to hold an election, despite manifestly not having
confidence in the government, and refused also to allow a recess to allow
the Conservative Party conference to go ahead. The apparent rationale for
this undemocratic action was that one could not waste the Supreme Court
judgment. The listlessness of Parliament on return confirms the emptiness
of the judgment.
The judgment follows from many of the lines noted earlier. It is the
capstone to the wider judicial-constitutional panic that has characterised
much of the last few years. It disabled the government from using one of its
tools to govern and it wrongly lent the authority of the courts to the
unconstitutional project of stage-managing the foreign policy of the
government by legislation. The judgment tightened the vice on the
government, making it harder either to govern or to force the issue (viz., to
persuade the Commons to withdraw confidence if it had no confidence).
The judgment was not well-received by the government or the wider
public, partly because the lack of dissenting voices, and the mismatch with
the judgments at first instance, made it clear that the judgment was scarcely
an application of settled law. It was perceived instead, rightly, as another
move, and a vital one, in the continuing recourse to the courts (and continued
subversion of constitutional government) that one political group was
making. The obvious pleasure with which Lady Hale crushed the
government was widely noted, as were her subsequent ill-judged comments.
For the Court’s apologists, the judgment was the Supreme Court’s finest
hour, a defence of parliamentary democracy against a populist government,
in which the parallels with the late Weimar period are overwhelming and in
which courts are the last bastions. This self-flattering narrative is absurd. In
truth, the courts abandoned law and made a political intervention, not to
prevent withdrawal from the EU but to give courage and comfort to the
parliamentary coalition which it (wrongly) identified as standing for the
constitution. This analysis was badly mistaken.

VII. IRRESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019, also known as the
Benn Act, was enacted in the days before prorogation. It was a constitutional
monstrosity,53 stage-managing the government’s foreign policy. It might
even have been reasonable for the government to have advised Her Majesty
to refuse to assent to the Bill, although obviously that would have created a
new and different crisis. Having enacted this measure, the predicted
(intended) consequence of which was to delay Brexit still further,
Parliament’s refusal to hold an election was a disgrace. The country was
clearly ungovernable, with the Commons having no confidence in
government but unwilling to withdraw confidence. The refusal to allow an
early election was a stratagem to force the Prime Minister to apply for an
extension and thus to break his word, which, the calculation went, would
Richard Ekins & Stephen Laws, Securing Electoral Accountability, POL’ Y EXCHANGE (Sept. 9,
2019),
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damage public trust in him. Only at this point would the Opposition consider
pulling the plug, and perhaps not even then; alternatively, some MPs aimed
to extract a second referendum as the price for an election. (It is a sign of
changing feeling within Parliament that at around this time the Liberal
Democrats, under new leadership, adopted a policy of revoking Article 50
without a referendum.)
A majority in the Commons refused to vote for an early election
nominally because of fear about when the Prime Ministers would schedule
it (viz., that he would schedule it for after 31 October). But this was an
illusory fear: a one-line bill would have answered the worry by specifying
the date on which the election was to be held. 54 The Fixed-term Parliaments
Act imposed on the whole House responsibility for dissolving Parliament if
need be. But in light of the Speaker’s abandonment of procedure, such that
a handful of backbench MPs could frame the parliamentary agenda without
responsibility, and the House’s (justified) fear of the electorate, the
Commons refused to exercise its responsibility and to call the election that
was so obviously needed. In quashing prorogation, the Supreme Court
robbed the government of its capacity to prevent unconstitutional action and
to force (provoke) the Commons to withdraw confidence. The Court
changed the law of the constitution, sanctifying the breakdown of
constitutional government and making the bad worse.
It is not easy to stage-manage foreign policy by legislation and the
government did cavil against the Benn Act’s imposition. It was reasonable
for the government to look for ways to minimise the damage the legislation
did. Hence the government might reasonably have made clear to the EU that
applying for an extension was not its policy and sent two letters to this end.
Or the government might have explained the reasons why it was obliged to
apply for an extension, reasons that were either incoherent or unappealing.
This was perhaps never a winning strategy—the EU was always likely to
agree to an extension—but it was reasonable, not least since the law does
not forbid one from complying grudgingly only so far as the law strictly
extends. Some argued that attempts to persuade the EU to decline the Article
50 application constituted frustration of the Act or, worse, misconduct in
public office, a common law offence subject to a maximum punishment of
life imprisonment. 55 Threatening government advisors with criminal
proceedings for aiming to minimise the Act’s damage to constitutional
government was ill-advised at best. However, it is true that the Prime
Minister wrongly flirted with the idea of not obeying the statute, 56 or at least
strongly implied that he would somehow resist the Act’s dictates, forcing
MPs to remove him from office in some way or defying the courts if and
when they ordered him to comply. This was never serious talk and the Lord
Chancellor and others walked firmly away from it. Still, it was not a good
way for the Prime Minister to engage with the law, even bad law. His excuse,
which is no justification, is that the Act was designed to foist on him
responsibility for the decisions of a cross-party coalition, and it was
politically imperative that he make clear to the public that he had done
everything possible to resist being forced to delay U.K. withdrawal.
The Benn Act was procured with the help of the votes of some twenty
or so Tory MPs, including some who had been senior cabinet ministers until
the change of Prime Ministers. The government warned them that, if they
54
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supported efforts to remove the government’s control of the agenda of the
House, the party whip would be withheld. The threat was carried out. Some
of these MPs subsequently returned to the fold but not all, and clearly in one
sense the move complicated the government’s position, by reducing its
nominal majority in the Commons. The move was derided as savage,
unreasonable, and shocking in its ruthlessness. On the contrary, it was
decisive and rational. The government had to make clear to the public that it
was intent on delivering its commitments and needed also to purge the party
of those who refused to support it in so doing. In any case, those who were
purged were mostly not willing to support the Labour opposition.
Upsetting all expectations, a new deal between EU and the U.K. was
reached, a deal with much better odds of being approved by the House of
Commons. The deal was put to the Commons for approval, just in time to
satisfy the Benn Act’s requirements and thereby prevent the coming into
force of the duty to apply for an Article 50 extension. A majority refused to
support the deal, reasoning that there remained a risk that the Prime Minister
would abandon his deal and attempt to take the U.K. out of the EU without
a deal. Hence, the majority, personified by Oliver Letwin MP who moved
the relevant amendments, would offer only conditional approval (which was
no approval at all in terms of the Act) unless and until legislation to
implement the deal had been enacted. This was almost to amend the Benn
Act by parliamentary motion. It added in a new obstacle to be cleared and
required the Prime Minister, reluctantly but immediately, to apply for an
extension. Legislation to implement the agreement was introduced, passing
a second reading but with obvious signs that it would be amended out of all
recognition by the House. That is, there was no firm majority support for the
Bill as introduced and the government withdrew it accordingly, demanding
instead that an early election be held (the EU by this time having agreed to
an extension until January 31, 2020).
The Opposition refused to allow an early election until the Liberal
Democrat Party and Scottish National Party, spying possible electoral
advantage, broke ranks and agreed to support a bill for an early election.
Amendments were moved to this one-line bill, with a view to expanding the
franchise for the general election to allow 16- and 17-year-olds and EU
nationals to vote. This was shockingly unconstitutional. Mercifully the
Acting Speaker refused the amendment on the grounds that it was out of
scope. This attempt to subvert the rules for the election passed by in haste
but warrants much greater condemnation than it received at the time.
The election that was to follow was in one sense a rerun of 2017, but
one in which it was clear that without a change in the parliamentary
arithmetic Brexit would not be delivered. The “revoke Article 50 now”
policy did not survive its encounter with voters, being met with much
derision, including by many who had voted Remain but who thought that
votes matter. Having equivocated for years, the Labour Party chose to
campaign for a second referendum, with its parliamentary caucus
overwhelming in favour of Remain, and fearing otherwise the defection of
its young, metropolitan voters to the Liberal Democrats. The Conservative
Party was able to campaign with unity, having purged some members from
its ranks and because an apparently palatable agreement with the EU had
been reached, such that there was no need to campaign for a no-deal exit.
The party was able also to invite public support to “get Brexit done” and
thus to defy the lawyers and others. This was a highly effective stratagem,
not least because the failings of Jeremy Corbyn MP, Leader of the
Opposition, had been widely exposed. The government secured a decisive
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majority ready to deliver on the commitments in question. Irresponsible
government thus ended, electoral accountability was restored, and the dead
Parliament of 2017–2019, to quote then Attorney General Geoffrey Cox MP,
put to rest.

CONCLUSION
The dynamics of parliamentary democracy led, remarkably, to the
question of whether the U.K. should remain an EU member being put on the
political agenda. This was a question that needed to be asked. The
electorate’s answer—that the U.K. should leave the EU—was always going
to be difficult to implement but was made much more difficult by the refusal
of so many to accept the legitimacy of the decision. Political litigation,
trading on misunderstandings about parliamentary sovereignty, prerogative,
and the political constitution, was important, delaying the triggering of
Article 50 and providing a more general strategy to attempt to frustrate
withdrawal. While parliamentary politics in early 2017 was non-destructive,
the reaction to the referendum and the framing of the Miller litigation sowed
the seeds for later trouble. Many members of the political and legal elite
seem wrongly to have persuaded themselves that they should obstruct
withdrawal from the EU and that in so doing they would somehow be
vindicating the constitution.
The new parliamentary arithmetic that followed from the 2017 election
made it much harder to implement the referendum’s outcome, but
nonetheless Parliament in 2018 did enact legislation that made provision for
exit, including a default of no-deal exit. Having made authoritative provision
for withdrawal, Parliament refused to accept a deal that would have avoided
the no-deal exit MPs said they feared. The refusal of MPs to support the
government’s deal resulted in delay, public distrust, and political
radicalisation. It was in 2019 that constitutional crisis unfolded, with
parliamentarians upending the political constitution by displacing the
government. The Supreme Court’s decision to quash prorogation helped to
shore up unconstitutional parliamentary action. This was a serious crisis,
with the FtPA enabling a majority to prevent an election, and with the
Speaker (and the Supreme Court) enabling a majority to govern without
responsibility.
However, the politics of the impasse proved unstable, and the
government managed to frame the crisis as an unconstitutional refusal of the
House of Commons to support withdrawal. Party political competition (and
miscalculation) resulted in an election, which returned a decisive
parliamentary majority in support of the U.K.’s orderly withdrawal from the
EU. It is entirely possible that the unconstitutional actions of
parliamentarians and judges in 2019 helped deliver the government’s
decisive majority by making the problem clear to the electorate. In this way,
the crisis may have begat its own solution. That said, no responsible
government or Parliament would risk a repeat of recent events, and it is
imperative now that the Supreme Court be brought to order, the Fixed-term
Parliaments Act be repealed,57 and the traditional relationship between
government and the Houses of Parliament be restored. These reforms
57

When enacted, the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill 2021-22, introduced as the Fixedterm Parliaments Act 2011 (Repeal) Bill, will repeal the FtPA and restore the prerogative of
dissolution.
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involve legislation, of course, but also require a reckoning with recent
events, to speak truthfully about what went wrong and why.

